Reception of English Common Law in the American Colonies by Stoebuck, William B.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 2 Article 7
Reception of English Common Law in the
American Colonies
William B. Stoebuck
Copyright c 1968 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American Colonies, 10 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 393 (1968), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss2/7
RECEPTION OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE
AMERICAN COLONIES
WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK*
So that we may start in cadence, some definitions are due. "Common
law" refers to that body of governing principles, mainly substantive,
expounded by the common-law courts of England in deciding cases
before them. "Reception" means adoption of the common law as the
basis for colonial judicial decisions. We are not concerned, as an end
in itself, with colonial court systems or with the mechanics of decision
making, though inquiries into these subjects, by inference, will advance
the quest.1 Similarly we are not concerned with the workaday study
of the colonial lawyer, his education, books, and role in society or with
the larger question of the contributions the common law made to the
emerging nation. The aim is simply to discover the extent to which the
common law as defined above, was received in the American colonies.
STANDARD THEORIES
There are more theories than facts on the influence of English com-
mon law in the colonies. Three of these might be referred to as the
"standard" ones, and they in turn have spawned comments and variations
upon themselves.
The most venerable standard theory is that the common law of Eng-
land was substantially in force in the colonies from the time of their
settlement. Justice Joseph Story stated it most succinctly in 1829 in
the famous passage in Van Ness v. Pacard:
The common law of England is not to be taken in all respects to
be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general
principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with
them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their
situation.2
Story's view was the generally accepted one through the nineteenth
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. For a lengthy study of courts as a branch of colonial government, see Surrency,
The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 Am. J. LEGAL Hisr. 253, 347 (1967).
2. Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 143-44 (1829).
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century. Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts took a similar
position in 1847 in Commonwealth v. Chapman.3 Kent in his Com-
mentaries also agrees, saying: "It [the common law] was imported by
our colonial ancestors, as far as it was applicable, and was sanctioned
by royal charters and colonial statutes." '
With the new interest in American legal history that arose early in
the twentieth century, Justice Story's theory was challenged. Professor
Paul S. Reinsch began the attack by asserting what we may refer to as
the second standard theory of reception of the common law. He denied
that, at least in the colonial beginnings in the seventeenth century and
perhaps along into the eighteenth as well, English jurisprudence was
even a subsidiary force in the American legal system. Though con-
ceding the colonists expressed adhesion to the common law, Reinsch says
the actual administration of justice was "of a rude, popular, summary
kind.. . ." Again, he asserted that the colonies underwent "a period
of rude, untechnical popular law, followed, as lawyers became numer-
ous and the study of law prominent, by the gradual reception of most
of the rules of the English common law." ' Dean Charles J. Hilkey soon
offered support for this view with what may be considered as a variant
of the Reinsch theory. Basing his study upon early Massachusetts Bay
materials, Hilkey admitted some influence from the common law but
emphasized two other sources of law, first the Bible, especially the
Mosaic code, and second an indigenous local element. He considered
the combination of these elements as forming what was in effect a new
legal system.7 Another writer whose ideas seem to augment the theory
advanced by Reinsch and Hilkey is Max Radin. He first made the
point that, since the common law was the king's law and since, except
for the writ of error, the king's writs did not run across the seas, it was
impossible to say the common law was obligatory on the colonies."
Radin felt the common law never amounted to more than a supple-
mental, subsidiary system during the whole colonial period, and he
3. 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 69 (1847).
4. 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AsmRCAN LAW * 473.
5. Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in I SELCr
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367, 369 (1907).
6. Id. at 370.
7. Hilkey, Legal Development in Colonial Massachusetts, 1630-1686, in 37 COLUM3IA
UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PtBIC LAW 160 (1910).
8. Radin, The Rivalry of Common-Law and Civil Law Ideas in the American
Colonies, in 2 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 404, 407-11 (1937).
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emphasized the importance of natural law, equating it with Roman
law.9
For the third standard theory of colonial common-law reception, we
are indebted to Professor Julius Goebel. Although agreeing in general
with Reinsch that the common law did not play a significant role in
the early colonies, Goebel found an English source for their law. In
his study, based upon Plymouth Colony from 1620 to 1650, he pre-
sented evidence that the law practiced was that of the customary law of
the local courts the colonists had known in England. He theorized that
the early settlers, having little knowledge of the common law, i.e., the
law of the king's courts at Westminster, naturally had recourse to the
law and procedure of the borough and manor courts with which they
were familiar.'0
There are some rather obvious inadequacies with the several theories.
First, of course, they are so disparate. Then they speak largely of New
England and largely of New England in the seventeenth century at
that. These comments should not be made critically, for the expectable
sources of information scarcely exist. Appellate court decisions are the
preferred source, but there are next to none; the only colonial reporter
of consequence is volume one of Harris & McHenry's Maryland Re-
ports, covering the period 1658-1774. If we look to the colonists for
contemporary accounts, we find they were singularly indifferent to the
common law's progress; moreover, when they did make glancing, often
unreliable, remarks on the subject, it is not clear what they meant by
"common law." Perhaps, in time, intensive local research may produce
direct materials, but for now the sources are mostly indirect and frag-
mentary: clauses in colonial charters, public attitudes toward English
law, court systems, conditions of law practice, and the like. From a
knowledge of these matters, it is possible to make the inference that
common-law reception was feasible, and likely had occurred, within
broad limits.
We are aided by having two fixed pillars between which to suspend
the historical bridge. The first-and it should not be minimized simply
because it is obvious-is that there was no common law in America on
12 May 1607. At the other end of the colonial period, by dint of ex-
amining every case reported in New York, Pennsylvania, and South
9. Id. at 427-28.
10. Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31
COLM. L. Rv. 416 (1931).
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Carolina from the Revolution to 1810, we are able to make some precise
observations on common-law reception as it must have stood on Inde-
pendence Day. The beginning and end are clear, even if the middle
is hazy.
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
The Colonial Charters
Within each colony the framework of government, and so of the
system of law as a part of that government, began with a royal charter.
No charter stated expressly that the system of courts was to be pat-
terned after that in England nor that the rules of law of the common-
law courts or of any named courts were to be the rules of decision. Most
colonial charters simply contained a proviso that the laws should not
be "'contrary to the Laws and Statutes of this our Realm of England'"
or were to be " 'agreeable to the laws of this our realme of England.' " 11
There is no evidence that it made any difference in the development of
law within a colony whether its charter said "not contrary" or "agree-
able."
The third charter of the Virginia Company, dated 12 March 1612,
chartered what amounted to a trading corporation and granted it land
by patent. After creating the governing bodies within the company,
including a quarterly court (used in the sense of "council"), it was pro-
vided that the quarterly court
shall likewise have full power and authority to ordain and make
such laws and ordinances for the good and welfare of the said
plantation, as to them, from time to time, shall be thought req-
uisite and meet: so always, as the same be not contrary to the
laws and statutes of this our realm of England .... 12
In Massachusetts Bay the charter of 4 March 1629, after making the
grant of land, set up governing bodies, including a council known as
the General Court. It was empowered to "make laws and ordinances...
so as such laws and ordinances be not contrary or repugnant to the laws
and statutes of this our realm of England." IS
Maryland was created 20 June 1632 as a proprietary colony with
11. BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW, 1776-1836, at 4-6 (1964).
12. 9 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 65 (Jensen ed. 1955).
13. ld. at 72.
[Vol. 10:393
RECEPTION OF COMMON LAW
Cecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore, "the true lord and proprietary."
Moreso than any other colony, Maryland was in form a feudal barony.
Calvert was to rule and make laws but only with the "advice, assent,
and approbation" of a majority of the freemen of the colony, or their
delegates, who were to be called together as a council to legislate. The
charter required the laws to be "consonant to reason, and be not re-
pugnant or contrary, but (so far as conveniently may be) agreeable to
the laws, statutes, customs and rights of this our kingdom of England." '4
Pennsylvania, like Maryland, was a proprietary colony, which was
granted to William Penn by a charter of 4 March 1681. Like Calvert,
Penn was to enact laws through an assembly of freemen or their dele-
gates. And again the laws they enacted were to be "consonant to rea-
son, and be not repugnant or contrary, but as near as conveniently may
be agreeable to the laws and statutes, and rights of this our kingdom
of England.... ." '" Unlike the other charters, the Pennsylvania charter
specifically reserved to the crown appeals "touching any judgment to
be there made or given."
Other colonial charters could be referred to, but the ones quoted from
are typical enough to serve our purposes. If the question before us is
the extent to which the rules and procedures of the English courts of
common law were in force in the colonies, we must ask what the char-
ters provided in this respect. One problem that has been commented
upon is what the charters referred to when they spoke of the "laws"
of England."8 Coke, writing of the period around 1630, says: "There
be divers lawes within the realme of England." He then lists fourteen
"laws," such as the law of the crown, law of parliament, law of nature,
statute law, customs, ecclesiastical law, etc., of which the "common
law of England" was only one. To which of these "laws" were the
colonists to conform?
There is another problem so obvious that it is remarkable it seems
not to have been raised by legal historians. In requiring colonial law
to be not contrary to, or repugnant to, English laws, the charters were
imposing requirements upon colonial legislative bodies. The require-
ment related to the kinds of statutes or ordinances that might be adopted,
14. Id. at 84. Also found in Smith, The Foundations of Law in Maryland: 1654-1715,
in LAW AND AtmsoRiry IN COLONIAL AmusmcA 92, 93-95 (Bilias ed. 1965).
15. 9 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DocuM NTs 93 (Jensen ed. 1955).
16. Howe, The Sources and Nature of Law in Colonial Massachusetts, in LAW AND
AuTHORiTY IN COLONIAL AmzRucA 1 (Billias ed. 1965).
17. CoKE oN LirrLToN *lb.
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but nothing was said about what courts might or might not do. The
one possible, and perhaps significant, exception was the Pennsylvania
charter's reservation to the crown of appeals from court judgments.
This suggests that the colonial charters, except possibly Pennsylvania's,
made no attempt to govern the rules of decision or procedures in the
courts unless, of course, a colonial statute was involved. An inference
is possible that this was thought unnecessary because it was assumed
that colonial courts would be more or less duplicates of those in England.
The fact that the reservation-of-appeal provision was inserted in the
Pennsylvania charter, written at the comparatively late date of 1681,
suggests the earlier assumptions had proved disappointing to the English
government.
Beginnings of the Colonies
One who reads historical materials on the colonial legal systems soon
becomes aware of some disturbing phenomena. In the first place, the
vast bulk of scholarship has been devoted to early Massachusetts and
very little to the other colonies. For instance, the studies done by
Reinsch and Hilkey were based upon Massachusetts Bay materials, and
Goebel's well known theory was based upon a study of Plymouth
Colony from 1620 to 1650.18 Furthermore, while considerable interest
has been shown in the seventeenth century beginnings, little indeed has
been written about the law of the more mature eigtheenth century
colonies. For these reasons, the approach used in this section of the
article will be to outline in some detail the legal system of seventeenth
century Massachusetts, then to make brief references to the systems in
the other colonies as compared with that in Massachusetts.
It is reasonably apparent that the early Massachusetts leaders did not
feel they were obligated to follow the common-law system or any
particular existing system except to the extent they freely chose.19 In
the 1630's, attempts to appeal Massachusetts judicial decisions to Eng-
land were quashed or frustrated.0 William Pynchon of Springfield, in
a letter of 9 March 1646 to John Winthrop, stated that he believed
Massachusetts Bay had liberty by her patent to make such laws as the
colony considered good.2' This view was probably held by most of the
colony's leading men.
18. See notes 5, 6, 7, and 10 supra for references to these studies.
19. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHOITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 114-15 (1960).
20. Id. at 64-65.
21. J. SMITH, COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS 19 (1961).
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On the other hand, the leaders were interested in a functioning legal
system, and the colony developed one that quickly became relatively
sophisticated. The first meeting of the Court of Assistants, held in Au-
gust 1630, conferred upon six of its members the powers of English
justices of the peace 2 In 1636, the system was expanded with inferior
courts established at Ipswich, Salem, Newtowne (Cambridge), and
Boston. When Massachusetts was divided into counties in 1643, the
Inferior Courts became known as County Courts. Above them, having
appellate jurisdiction and some original jurisdiction, was the Court of
Assistants which held quarterly sessions. The highest court was the
General Court, which eventually was to become the Supreme Court of
Judicature.2 3 Of course the legal system of 1640 was nothing as com-
plex as that comprising all the specialized courts in England. However,
later, around 1700, under pressure from the British government, some
new, specialized courts were created 24
Little is known of Massachusetts's substantive law prior to the adop-
tion of the Body of Liberties of 1641. The magistrates and those in
authority resisted written law, having a paternalistic approach toward
the governing of the colony.25 However, there must have been some
common-law influence, for technical English terms such as capias and
in fo ma pauperis were used. Juries were used from the beginning, and
forms of action denominated debt, replevin, trespass, and trespass on the
case were employed. 6 In 1641, at the insistence of the General Court,
the comprehensive code known as the Body of Liberties was adopted.
By examining its provisions we get some idea of the various elements-
English, Biblical, indigenous, or other-from which early Massachusetts
law was formed. The code finally adopted was drafted by Nathaniel
Ward, a minister who had English legal training. It is interesting, per-
haps significant, to observe that an earlier draft prepared by John Cotton
and rejected by the General Court was based on the Scriptures more
than was Ward's draft.
Much has been said of the influence of the Bible. Reinsch particularly
takes a strong position on this point: "Everywhere, the divine law,
interpreted by the best discretion of the magistrates, is looked upon
as the binding subsidiary law; while the common law is at most referred
22. HASKINS, supra note 19, at 27.
23. Id. at 32-34.
24. Howe, supra note 5, at 372.
25. Reinsch, supra note 5, at 372.
26. HASINS, supra note 19, at 117-18.
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to for the sake of illustration." Perhaps it would be safer to say that
the early Massachusetts leaders, at least in attitude, felt their laws were
opposed neither to Biblical law nor common law, for, as a communica-
tion of the General Court said in 1646, the common law was founded
on the law of God.
The Biblical influence was strongest in criminal law; here was the
greatest divergence from English law.28 In the Massachusetts code of
1648, the descriptions of certain crimes were lifted nearly verbatim from
the Bible, especially from Leviticus and Deuteronomy. Examples are:
idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, bestiality, sodomy, adultery, man steal-
ing, treason, false witness with intent to take a life, cursing or striking
a parent, rebelliousness against parents, and malicious killing. All of
these were capital offenses. However, not all the capital offenses named
in the Bible were made such by the code of 1648, and some non-capital
punishments were made less severe. Yet, even in criminal law there
were some common-law influences. The rape statute was copied after
the common law. And, though the capital offense of sodomy was Bib-
lical, boys under the common-law age of consent, fourteen years, were
not to receive capital punishment.29
Massachusetts land law was based upon the common-law system,
with important modifications. Feudal tenures or incidents never were
recognized, but the method of land division bore a striking resemblance
to that of English villages.- ° Conveyances could be made by written
deed. By an order of 1651, grants in fee simple had to run "'to the
Party or Grantee his Heires and Assignes forever.'" Life estates and
terms for years were recognized by those names.31 In 1647, the General
Court enacted a statute, obviously taken directly from the common law
of dower, giving a wife a one-third "dower" interest in all lands her
husband held during marriage.s2
The law of succession, while basically English, had important modi-
fications imposed upon it. From the beginning the courts enforced the
right to pass land and personalty by will; furthermore, after 1641, this
was expressly provided for by the Body of Liberties. In cases of in-
27. Reinsch, supra note 5, at 373-81.
28. Hilkey, supra note 7, at 249-67.
29. HASKINS, supra note 19, at 142-62.
30. Andrews, The Influence of Colonial Conditions as Illustrated in the Connecticut
Intestacy Law, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AmERCAN LEGAL HISTORY 431-32 (1907).
31. Hilkey, supra note 7, at 279-83.
32. Haskins, Reception of the Common Law in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts: A
Case Study, in LAW AND AuTHORITy IN CoLoNiAL AMERICA 17 (Bilias ed. 1965).
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testacy all children, male and female, shared equally, but, perhaps in
grudging recognition of primogeniture or perhaps inspired by some
English local custom, the eldest son got a double portion. The widow,
of course, was protected by the previously mentioned dower system."
Goebel and Haskins give convincing evidence of influence from Eng-
lish local customary law. Both feel the local Massachusetts courts in
particular copied many of their practices and rules of law from a recol-
lected synthesis of such customary law, though probably not outright
from the printed custumals used in the English local courts. 4 Haskins
notes that systems of inheritance similar to that in Massachusetts existed
by custom in many English localities. He also points out that the Mas-
sachusetts Act of 1840, providing for the recording of deeds and mort-
gages in town records, established a system similar to that used in many
English boroughs since the Middle Ages. 5
Having sketched some of the salient features of the components of
early Massachusetts law, we will now make brief, comparative reference
to the other colonies. It should be kept emphatically in mind that the
law did not grow by common design in the colonies; each colony
developed its own legal system. The assumption that colonial law was
essentially the same in all colonies is wholly without foundation.36
Moreover, it is unfortunate that we must use Massachusetts as a stand-
ard of comparison, because, with respect to its legal development, that
colony was not at all typical. From its beginning as a haven for Puritan
dissenters until the Minutemen faced the British regulars on the Lex-
ington Green, Massachusetts was always the sulky child, rebellious
against things English. We would expect the English common law to
have less influence there and in the other similarly situated New England
colonies than in the colonies to the south.
In New York the common law was given more recognition than in
most colonies. While the common-law cases were not held biding
until 1761, the English influence was strong from the time the British
took New York from the Dutch in 1664. In 1665, Governor Nichols
wrote that legal affairs were conducted in a more regular manner than
in the other colonies. He reported to the Board of Trade in 1669 that
juries were used in all cases and that there were no laws contrary to.
those of England. A report by Governor Dongan in 1687 described a
33. Hilkey, supra note 7, at 293-96.
34. Goebel, supra note 10; HASKINS, supra note 19, at 163-82.
35. HASKINS, supra note 19, at 163-82.
36. Id. at 6-7.
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system of six kinds of courts, including one of chancery that consisted
of the governor and council.87
In Pennsylvania, it appears that legal procedures were very irregular
before Penn received his charter in 1681. Thereafter, Pennsylvania
developed the most complete system of codes of any colony, and the
courts exercised both law and equity jurisdiction.88 The tradition, stated
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1810, was that the charter
had extended the common law.89 However, it seems the courts felt
they had the power to depart from specific common-law rules when
they concluded that some overriding situation in the colony required
it. For instance, in Pennsylvania married women were empowered to
convey land simply by signing a deed before witnesses, though it was
well known that the English rule permitted this only by a fine.40 Re-
ception and development of the common law in Pennsylvania must have
been inhibited by the fact that, while the Pennsylvania bar had become
distinguished by the time of the Revolution, it was comparatively late
in getting a body of trained lawyers.41
The court system in Maryland was unique, at least in theory. Because
of the form of the grant to Lord Baltimore, he could create manors and
boroughs which might have had local courts like their ancient counter-
parts in England. In fact, such local courts seem not to have been
significant factors, since there probably were only two manorial courts
and two borough courts that actually operated.42 Maryland's Assembly
probably played the dominant -role in developing the colony's legal
system, enacting about one thousand general laws between 1638 and
1715. Some acts of Parliament were regarded as binding and some were
not, but the basis for choice is not clear. Where statutes did not con-
trol, English common law seems to have been regarded as the basis for
decision as much of the common-law civil and criminal procedure was
used.48
The fragments of information we have, point to the conclusion that
the common law was more revered in Virginia than in Massachusetts.
37. Reinsch, supra note 5, at 390-95.
38. Id. at 396.
39. Kirk v. Dean, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 341 (1810).
40. Kirk v. Dean, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 341 (1810); Davey v. Turner, 1 U.S. (1 Dali). ii
(1764).
41. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 102 (1913).
42. Smith, The Foundations of Law in Maryland: 1634-1715, in LAW AND Au moRrry
IN COLONIAL AMERICA 92, 94, 102, 109 n.7 (Billias ed. 1965).
43. Id. at 95-98, 100-102.
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In Virginia, the purposes of settlement were less to pull away from
England and more to preserve the principle of loyalty to the crown in
the face of trying conditions. 44 Instructions from the company in Lon-
don to the colonial government, dated 24 July 1621, were "'to imitate
and follow the policy of the form of government, laws, customs, and
manner of trial, and other administration of justice used in the realm of
England, as near as may be .... ,' When the company's charter was
vacated in 1624 and Virginia thus became the first royal colony, the
change was not very marked in the colony. 46 After Bacon's Rebellion
in 1676, however, there was a break in the unity between king and
subject in Virginia, and this may have manifested itself in a lessened
regard for the king's law. 7
New Jersey has been regarded as following English precedents to
a high degree.48 During the period when the colony was divided into
East Jersey and West Jersey, it seems the common law was more in-
fluential in West Jersey. East Jersey's legal system has been likened
to that of early Massachusetts, with a heavy Biblical cast to the laws.
From 1693, West Jersey had a three-tiered court system and a more
regular administration of justice than in East Jerseyi0
The situation in early Rhode Island, Connecticut, and, perhaps to
a lesser extent in New Hampshire, seems to have been roughly com-'
parable to that in Massachusetts. Rhode Island adopted a rudimentary
civil and criminal code in 1647, most of whose provisions were lifted'
verbatim from Dalton's Country Justice, a handbook for English justices
of the peace.50 In 1699, Governor Bellomont, transmitting the Rhode
Island laws to the Privy Council, wrote that court proceedings were
in no wise agreeable to English practice. Yet, in 1708, Governor Cran-
ston wrote the Lords of Trade that the laws of England were generally
in force. Developments in the Connecticut and New Haven colonies
seem to have closely mirrored those in Massachusetts in the seventeenth
century, with the English influence being, if anything, slightly less. In
New Hampshire, the story was similar to that in Massachusetts, though
44. Washburn, Law and Authority in Colonial Virginia, in LAw AND Auarrmy IN
COLONIAL AzmCuA 116 (Billias ed. 1965).
45. 9 ENGUtsH HisromicAL Docuzummrs 185 (Jensen ed. 1955).
46. KErrH, THE FIsT BitrISH Em.sPIRE 25 (1930).
47. Washburn, supra note 44.
48. WARREN, supra note 41, at 113.
49. Reinsch, supra note 5, at 395-96.
50. Howe, supra note 16, at 13-14.
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there may have been more reliance on English law and less on Biblical
doctrines.5'
The Seventeenth Century Lawyer
To a certain degree we should be able to know something of the
kind of law practiced by knowing the qualities of the lawyers who
practiced it. If, for instance, we were told that all the lawyers in one
colony were part-time farmers and largely uneducated, whereas most
of the lawyers in another colony were educated in the English inns of
court, it would be a fair inference that the common law had the greater
influence in the latter colony.
Little is known of the training of colonial lawyers in the seventeenth
century. There were no lawyers on the Mayflower, but Massachusetts
Bay had a few English-trained lawyers, most of whom did not practice.
Governor John Winthrop and Emanuel Downing had studied at the
Inner Temple but did not practice. Likewise, Nathaniel Ward, who
drafted the 1641 Body of Liberties, had been a barrister of Lincoln's
Inn; however, he served as a minister in Massachusetts. Thomas Mor-
ton, a member of either Furnewell's Inn or Clifford's Inn (equity inns)
came to Massachusetts in 1624 or 1625 and practiced for a while until
he was expelled for what the colony's leaders considered personal mis-
conduct. Thomas Lechford, of Clement's Inn (another equity inn)
practiced a little in Massachusetts for a year or two until he was dis-
barred for some sort of professional misconduct. No other English-
trained lawyers are known to have lived in Massachusetts during the
seventeenth century. Legal matters seem to have been cared for by a
class of part-time practitioners who were informally, and most likely
often indifferently, trained.52
When Connecticut was settled in 1636-1637, three of its leaders had
English legal educations. Roger Ludlow and Governor John Winthrop
the younger were of the Inner Temple, and Governor John Haynes
was "very learned in the laws of England." However, they apparently
practiced little, if at all, and Connecticut had no other known lawyers
with formal training in the seventeenth century. The handling of legal
matters seems to have been by a group less skilled than in Massachusetts.
In Maine one "English barrister," Thomas Gorges, head of the colonial
51. Reinsch, supra note 5, at 386-90.
52. WARREN, supra note 41, at 59-73; Hilkey, Legal Development in Colonial Massa-
chusetts, 1630-1686, in 37 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HIStoRY, ECONOMICS AND
PUBLIC LAW 216-21 (1910).
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government, practiced in the seventeenth century. Virginia had two
English-educated lawyers present in that century. Henry Justice, of
the Middle Temple, was transported to Virginia for theft in 1636, and
we know of the later presence of William Fitzhugh, born in 1651 and
"educated as a lawyer in England." Reportedly there were thirty-three
persons practicing law in Virginia in 1680.
While Maryland was noted for having a trained bar earlier than any
other colony, its seventeenth century bar seems to have included only
two English-trained lawyers, and these late in the century. Charles
Carroll, a member of the Inner Temple, came to Maryland in 1688, and
Henry Jowles, "a barrister," became Chancellor in 1697.
Research discloses no other English-trained lawyers who may have
practiced in the colonies before 1700. Warren says the practice in New
Jersey was "evidently engaged in chiefly by pettifoggers and by the
court officers...." For seventy years after its settlement, Pennsylvania,
though its bar later flourished, had practically no lawyers with any kind
of training.a The clear inference is that English-trained lawyers were
so few and so scattered in the colonies in the seventeenth century as
to have, by themselves, a negligible effect upon the practice of law.
Legal Materials in the Seventeenth Century
A common-law lawyer must have his law books. To a considerable
extent, then, if we know what books on the common law are present
at a given time and place, we can infer the extent to which that law is
followed. While much more information on colonial law libraries is
needed, what is available will advance our investigation in some degree.
The colonists were almost totally dependent upon importation from
England for common-law materials. Before the Revolution only thirty-
three law books, including eight editions of one, were published in
America. Most of these were manuals for justices of the peace, sheriffs,
and other local officers or tracts on the rights of Englishmen, especially
the right of trial by jury. No English case reports were reproduced,
nor was the treatise of any standard English law writer, except for
Blackstone's Commentaries, but the first American edition of this did
not appear until 1771-1772.1'
53. The information on Connecticut, Maine, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania is drawn from WA-REN, supra note 41, at 44-45, 54-55, 102, 112, 128-34,
and 139. Warren does not closely document his sources, so, it is difficult to go behind
his statements.
54. WMARnm, supra note 41, at 157-60.
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Of the few English law books known to have been in the colonies
before 1700, almost all were treatises. Coke on Littleton was the pre-
dominant treatise for lawyers during the entire colonial period. 5 A
partial set of Coke's Reports travelled over on the Mayflower,5" though
its utility must have been marginal, since no lawyer was aboard. In
1647, the Massachusetts General Court voted to import two copies each
of Coke's Reports, Coke on Littleton, Coke on Magna Carta, Book of
Entries, New Terms of the Law, and Dalton's Justice of the Peace.
Examination of the Suffolk County (Boston) court records from 1671
to 1680 disclosed citation of only Coke on Littleton and a volume on
the law merchant. 7
The most complete record available of a colonial justice of the peace
court is the so-called Pynchon Court Record, covering the proceedings
of the local court at Springfield, Massachusetts, from 1639 to 1702. It
does not contain any reference to an English text or to a case of any
English or American court. However, the three successive judges who
kept the record had some familiarity with a limited number of English
treatises. William Pynchon, in a letter dated 9 March 1646, makes pass-
ing reference to Fortescue's Laws of England and Dalton's Country
Justice. The inventory filed in the estate of his grandson, John Pynchon,
Jr., in 1721 listed the following law books: "'Fortaques [Fortescue]
on the Laws, law Dictionary, A New England Law Book, Cook upon
Littleton, Finches laws, Magna Charta, Dalton's Statutes, Dalton on the
Laws of England.'" Some of these may have belonged to John, his
father, or even to William."
None of the foregoing establishes that the common law of England
was not applied in the colonies in the seventeenth century. The fact
that a lawyer is not trained in England does not prove he cannot under-
stand and use English precedents. The countless American lawyers
who have been trained since the Revolution by law schools, office
clerkship, and even self-study demonstrates this. However, when, in
seventeenth century America, we find no appreciable number of Eng-
lish-educated lawyers, when we find no evidence of an organized native
system of legal education, and especially when the courts were staffed
55. Thorne, SIR EDWARD COKE 1552-1952, 3 (published in pamphlet form by the
Selden Society 1957).
56. Id.
57. Chafee, Colonial Courts and the Common Law, in 68 PROCEEDINGS OF MASSACHUSErTS
HISTORICAL SOCIETY 132, 157-58 (1952).
58. J. SMITH, COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS 19-20, 157-58 (1961).
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by lay judges, it is difficult to imagine any sophisticated or highly tech-
nical use of common-law cases and authorities. The probability is that,
at least on the appellate level, the basic principles of the common law
were known and considered, perhaps from reference to a limited supply
of English secondary authorities, such as Coke.
A GENERATION OF CHANGE
A sailor would know how to express it. He has been sailing a reach
with sails luffing, making way but not as he might. This would be the
course of the common law in the 17th century. When our sailor realizes
the situation, he tightens the sheets, snubs off, and proceeds anew, not
on a different tack but with a taut boat and quickened pace. There is
reason enough to theorize that something like this happened to the
colonial ship of state, in historical perspective quite dramatically, during
about a generation beginning almost precisely with the year 1700. Prob-
ably it was the Council of Trade and Plantations and the Board of
Trade that tightened the lines, and the colonies responded.
Directions from England
The British probably had a desire for more control over the colonies
about forty or fifty years before the turn of the century. But the
political convulsions that rocked England between the Grand Remon-
strance of 1641 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 seem to have
delayed a sustained effort in this direction. The first real parliamentary
legislation for the colonies was an act of 19 May 1649, which declared
England and its colonies a commonwealth, to be governed by the
"supreme authority," Parliament; however, upon the Restoration that
act was repealed. 9
The year 1664 saw two events that evinced increased English interest
in the American colonies. A British fleet captured New Amsterdam
from the Dutch, and Charles II granted it to his brother, the Duke of
York, renaming it New York. The following year the Duke pro-
mulgated the code of law known as the "Duke's Laws" and installed
as the English governor Richard Nichols (or "Nicolls").69 Also in 1664
a four-man royal commission visited Boston, apparently for the intended
purpose of acting as a royal court to override the colony's courts. But
59. Kurrm, supra note 46 at 3-9.
60. Johnson, The Advent of Conmzon Law in Colonial New York, in LAw AND
AuTroarrY IN COLONIAL AmEmcA 74 (Billias ed. 1965).
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after meeting stubborn resistance from the local freemen, the com-
missioners abandoned their mission and left Massachusetts. 6
England again tried to tighten its grasp on recalcitrant New England
in 1685 by combining the New England colonies, New York, and the
Jerseys into one viceroyalty called the Dominion of New England. Sir
Edmund Andros was appointed governor, who, with a council, was to
try civil and criminal cases according to the laws and the statutes of
England. This move produced remonstrances in the colonies involved,
notably the revolt led in New York by Jacob Leisler, and the Dominion
collapsed in 1688.62
By the 1680's and 1690's, the British government began taking steps
that produced a real and lasting tightening of control. In 1684, the
Massachusetts Bay charter was annulled. By a new charter of 1692 the
colony became a royal colony with an appointed governor, who, with
his council, appointed judges and justices of the peace. Thereafter, the
practice of law in Massachusetts became more regular and technical.
63
In 1692, Maryland's proprietary charter was annulled, a royal governor
was appointed, and the province became a royal colony. While local
practice in law may have been little affected, a new court of appeals and
new admiralty courts were set up.64 In New York, the Supreme Court
of Judicature was established in 1691, and one author believes there was
at this time a rather sudden increase in reliance on the common law
in that colony.6"
The great Navigation Act of 1696 must be noted. By this Act Par-
liament created a system of six colonial vice-admiralty districts and
courts, with the judges and other officers commissioned by the English
lords of admiralty. The first vice-admiralty court began to sit in Massa-
chusetts in 1699. Although its procedures were more informal than in
the English High Court of Admiralty, the Massachusetts court seems to
have taken jurisdiction over more matters than the High Court. In the
eighteenth century, at least in Massachusetts, the vice-admiralty court
became a symbol of oppressive British control. After 1760, it was in this
court that all the hated Acts of Trade were enforced.66
61. Hilkey, supra note 52, at 160.
62. 1 MoRIsoN AND COMMAGER, GROWTH OF Tar AMFICAN REPuBmic 84 (5th ed.
1962); JOHNSON, supra note 60.
63. Reinsch, supra note 5, at 383-85.
64. SMiTH, supra note 42, at 94-95.
65. Johnson, supra note 60.
66. Wroth, The Massachusetts Vice-Admiralty Court, in LAW A" AumoTrry IN
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Statutory revision and codification is another area in which evidence
of change can be seen. There were a few isolated examples of statute
revision in the colonies during the seventeenth century but no real
impetus for change until almost precisely 1700, when the Council of
Trade and Plantations exerted pressure. In response, for the next fifteen
or twenty years there was quite a rash of revisions and codifications.
Whereas the colonial laws had previously been gathered together in
cumbersome bundles of manuscripts, now they were put in a form
more usable, not only by the Privy Council, but by the colonial bench
and bar. After approximately 1720, the laws were generally printed
by colonial printers such as Benjamin Franklin.
In 1700, the Privy Council wrote to the colonial governors in Bar-
bados and America, requesting reports on their court procedures. Re-
plies are extant from Barbados, Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island,
Maryland, and Virginia.68 These replies show court systems that varied
among themselves rather more than do American state courts today
and which clearly were products of the English court system, mainly
of the common-law and equity courts. In varying degrees they were
abbreviations of the English system, and the procedures are clearly
derivatives of English ones. We find direct statements that the com-
mon law was applied as the rule of decision"9 or at least that the
common-law forms of action were used.70
More important than what the colonial governors reported are ques-
tions having to do with what they and their subjects thought about
the act of reporting. The inferences are fairly strong that during most
of the seventeenth century the colonists were too busy with the mun-
dane, often grim, aspects of securing a beachhead on a hostile shore
to reflect much upon the law as a science. A modicum of law and
order was a utilitarian necessity, and that was about it. Now, nudged
by the home government, the colonists were asked to examine them-
COLONIAL AMFIUCA 32 (Billias ed. 1965); Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies,
11 Am. J. LEGAL HIsr. 253, 355-56 (1967).
67. Surrency, Revision of Colonial Laws, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189 (1965).
68. Surrency, Report on Court Procedures in the Colonies-1700, 9 AM. J. LEGAL
Hisr. 69-72 (1965).
69. Id. at 177 (New York), 238 (Rhode Island), and 239 (Virginia). The reply
from Virginia was quite explicit: "[Tlhe proceedings are in English and Judgmts:
grounded & passed according (or as near) to ye Com[m]on & statute Laws of England
& ye Circumstances of ye Country will admitt & to such peculiar Laws as are made
suitable to ye present state of ye Country."
70. Id. at 169 (Maryland) and 173 (Massachusetts).
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selves and say what was their Law in a more speculative sense. This
kind of introspection would normally be expected to produce change
and refinement and, in the context of 1700, to make the colonies imi-
tate more closely the refinements of the common law.
Colonial Response
On the basis of the evidence, one may infer that English control
over colonial legal systems, and by further inference, the influence of
the common law, increased perceptibly very near the year 1700. There
is also evidence that the colonists themselves became more receptive
to the common law shortly after that date.
When we say the colonists had certain attitudes toward the common
law, we must be careful to define what we mean by "common law."
The object of this article has been to determine the extent to which
the procedures and rules of the king's courts of common law governed
or influenced the resolution of legal disputes in American courts. How-
ever, the colonists did not always think of the "common law" in this
way, and it might be possible to build up a case that did not exist by
citing certain contemporary colonial references to the "common law."
Often in times of pressure from the English government or from
their own colonial governments, the colonists would raise a popular
clamor for "the common law of England" as a shield against their
oppressors. But in this context they meant almost exclusively the pub-
lic aspects they felt guaranteed political freedom, i.e., constitutional
principles, such as trial by jury.7' A popular outcry of this kind was
raised against the autocratic leaders of Massachusetts in the 1640s.72
In Maryland for a century after its founding in 1634, the colonists
claimed the benefits of the common law in opposition to the proprietor's
contention that by the terms of his grant he had the absolute right to
govern. 7a Daniel Dulany's pungent pamphlet of 1728 even went so far
as to urge his fellow Marylanders to adopt both the common law and
all English statutes.74
71. Howe, supra note 16; KEITH, supra note 46, at 194-86; Reinsch, supra note 5, at
383-84.
72. Howe, supra note 16.
73. WARREN, supra note 41, at 49-50.
74. DULANY, THE RIGHT OF THE INHABITANTS OF MARYLAND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
ENGLISH LAWS (1728). This pamphlet is reprinted in an appendix to Sioussat, The English
Statutes in Maryland, in ser. 21, Nos. 11-12, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1903).
[Vol. 10:393
RECEPTION OF COMMON LAW
Another kind of evidence can be found and this points toward an
increasing use of English common law in the sense this article defines
the term. Obviously such a development would not occur at a certain
instant, but the indications are that impetus in this direction was con-
siderably felt in the generation beginning about 1700. In 1712, the
South Carolina legislature enacted a statute formally adopting the Eng-
lish common law as the rule of judicature and also adopting 126 named
English statutes that had been selected by Chief Justice Nicholas Trott.75
North Carolina, in 1715, enacted a statute adopting the common law
"so far as shall be compatible with our way of living and trade." 71
Pennsylvania's Assembly passed an act expressly extending several Eng-
lish penal statutes in 1718. The preamble to this act recited that the
common law was the birthright of English subjects and so ought to be
the rule in British dominions. 77
The citation of English cases as authority can be traced to the early
1700's. Reinsch reports the citation and following of an English case
in North Carolina in 1729.78 A scanning of all cases in Volume 1 of
Harris & McHenry's Reports for Maryland covering the years 1658
to 1774, showed the earliest citation of English cases to have been in
1718 in Tanner v. Freeland.79 Earlier cases were so sketchily reported
that it seems quite possible that common-law cases were relied upon
before then but simply not noted by the reporters. After 1718, English
cases were cited to and by the Maryland court in gradually increasing
numbers. Even in this later period, much depended upon the style of
the several reporters, with varying degrees of attention being given to
the citation and discussion of English cases.
Consider another important factor reflecting upon the reception of
common law, the quality of the judiciary. Not only were there prac-
tically no English-trained judges on the colonial bench during the
seventeenth century, but it seems to have been made up in large part
of men who were not lawyers at all. Again, signs of an abrupt change
can be seen beginning at the turn of the century. The first professional
lawyer to become judge of an appellate court may have been Henry
Jowles, an English barrister who became chancellor of Maryland in
75. Reinsch, supra note 5, at 407-10.
76. WAamrN, supra note 41, at 122-23.
77. Sioussat, The Theory of the Extension of English Statutes to the Plantations, in
1 SELECr ESSAYS ix ANGLo-AmICAN LEGAL HxsioRy 416, 426-27 (1907).
78. Reinsch, supra note 5, at 409.
79. 1 Md. 34 (1718).
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1697.80 The first lawyer to become chief justice of New York was
William Attwood, an English lawyer who arrived in 1701.81 In Penn-
sylvania, the first lawyer to become chief justice was John Guest, an
English barrister, in 1706. William Penn, anxious to obtain trained
lawyers, had given Roger Mompesson, a good English lawyer, a com-
mission as chief justice, but Mompesson declined the office and went
to New York where he was chief justice from 1706 to 1715.82 New
Hampshire, however, had no practicing attorney on the bench until
1754. 83
The evidence indicates two significant kinds of activity and change
traceable almost to the year 1700. First, the British government resolved
to regularize colonial legal systems and took effective action to carry
out this resolve. This development is consistent with the larger his-
torical background of an England that, after the disturbances of the
latter half of the seventeenth century, had put its house in order and
now attended to some overdue business in the plantations. Second, in
roughly the generation following 1700, the colonies themselves evinced
a quickening interest in the refinement of their legal systems, part of
which was demonstrably in response to orders from the home govern-
ment. All this suggests most strongly that the condition of the colonies
became, in a short span of time, more receptive to the common law,
from which we may infer the common law must have become more
understood and followed at this time.
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
It is curious that legal historians have dealt little with eighteenth
century common-law reception, less in fact than they have with seven-
teenth century developments. The subject did not interest the colonials
either, quite possibly because they preferred not to disclose the results
of such a study to his majesty's government. However, we do have
comparatively good information on some institutions that established
perimeters within which the common law probably was applied. By
depicting the eighteenth century colonial lawyer, with his training and
legal materials, we can judge with some degree of certainty the extent
to which the common law could have been received. And by examina-
80. WARRN, supra note 41, at 54-55.
81. 2 CGRs'm, COURTS AND LAwy oF NEW Yomt; A HIsToRy 1609-1925, 494 (1925).
82. Id. at 519-20; Reinsch, supra note 5, at 396-400.
83. WAREN, supra note 41, at 134-38.
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tion of thousands of state-court decisions handed down immediately
after the Revolution, some detailed, categorical statements can be made
about affairs at the end of the colonial period.
The Eighteenth Century Lawyer
Almost from the beginning of the eighteenth century a growth in
numbers and improvement in training of the colonial bar can be
found. Warren estimates that between twenty-five and fifty American-
born lawyers were educated in England before 1760 and that about one
hundred and fifteen Americans were admitted to the inns of court
between 1760 and the close of the Revolution. Of this latter group, he
concludes forty-seven were from South Carolina, twenty-one from
Virginia, sixteen from Maryland, eleven from Pennsylvania, five from
New York, and one or two from each of the other colonies."4
Massachusetts seems to have depended little upon the English inns
for the education of its eighteenth century lawyers. Most of the
handful present held official positions in the colony's legal system.
However, it appears a rather efficient system of educating lawyers by
"reading law" in the offices of established lawyers was in operation. The
students thus trained often were graduates of Harvard, Brown, or some
other college and entered upon their law, studies with a good general
education. As an outstanding example, the office of the leading lawyer
Jeremiah Gridley produced James Otis, Jr., the famous opponent of the
writs of assistance, and William Cushing, who became a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court. Other offices trained President John
Adams, Robert Treat Paine, David Sewall, who became a federal judge,
and James Sullivan, a judge and attorney general of Massachusetts.
The term "barrister" was used to describe those lawyers admitted, under
rules adopted by the Superior Court of Judicature, to practice in court.
A total of fifty-six men are believed to have been made barristers, of
whom twenty-five were practicing in 1768.85
In the other New England colonies the local benches and bars were
at a low ebb in the eighteenth century. In Rhode Island, the judges
were elected annually until fifty years after the Revolution and were
mostly laymen uneducated in the law. 6 Warren lists no Rhode Island
lawyer trained in England, and he says there were only a few with
84. Id. at 188.
85. DAvis, HsToRY OF THE JuDicIARY OF MASSACHUSETrS 76-223, 295-97 (1900).
86. DuRFaE, GLEANMNGS FROM THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF RHODE IsLAND 14-17 (1883).
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American legal training. The state of the bars in Connecticut and New
Hampshire seems to have been much like that in Rhode Island. Warren
names one English barrister who came to New Hampshire in 1758.
In Maine, there were only six "educated lawyers" in 1770, none of
whom was English-trained.
The middle and southern colonies depended upon the English inns
of court in the eighteenth century far more than did New England.
From a slow start, Pennsylvania flowered in producing outstanding
lawyers in the period of approximately twenty years before the Revolu-
tion. Only South Carolina finally possessed more men than Pennsylvania
who were trained at the inns of court. Some of the more outstanding
of these in Pennsylvania were Andrew Hamilton, famous for his de-
fense of John Peter Zenger, Pennsylvania chief justices Thomas Mc-
kean and Edward Shippen, and the eminent lawyers John Dickinson
and George Read. Maryland seems to have drawn upon the English
inns to about the same extent as Pennsylvania. The Maryland bar had
the reputation of being better trained from an earlier period than any
other and was always highly regarded.
Virginia may well have had the best overall system of legal education
of any colony. Although Warren says Pennsylvania had more lawyers
from the inns of court than any colony except South Carolina, he lists
by name more of them for Virginia than for Pennsylvania. At any
rate, the number of English-trained lawyers must have been large in
Virginia. In addition, Virginia, like Massachusetts, seems to have
developed a successful system of education by office apprenticeship.
The great George Wythe, who himself apparently received his legal
education in Virginia, provided in his single office the legal educations
of Jefferson, Marshall, Madison, and Monroe.
South Carolina became a royal province in 1720. Thereafter most
of its chief justices were educated lawyers, though most associate jus-
tices were laymen. Because the colony, in adopting a list of specified
English statutes in 1712, had adopted the one governing the examination
and admission of lawyers, the requirements for practice were strict.
As a result, the bar was never large (no more than fifty-eight members
were admitted before the Revolution) but it was the highest educated
bar in the colonies and contained the largest proportion of English-
trained lawyers.
Not much is known of the North Carolina and Georgia bars, and
neither colony had large numbers of lawyers. While there were several
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English-trained lawyers in North Carolina, most, including James Ire-
dell, who became a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, studied
in law offices in North Carolina and other colonies. Georgia had no
courts until 1733. After it became a crown colony in 1752, the chief
justice was required to be an "English barrister," but the three assistant
judges were usually laymen. The eighteenth century bar was small,
though it contained a few English-trained lawyers practicing in Savan-
nah.8 7
Perhaps a few words should be said about the lawyer's public image
in colonial times. Through most of the period he was an unpopular
figure. In the middle part of the 1600's several colonies maintained
statutes prohibiting charging fees for legal services.88 Of course, the
class of persons holding themselves out as legal counsel may have justi-
fied such stringencies. In 1729, the Rhode Island assembly passed an
act forbidding lawyers to sit as members,"9 and there was widespread
popular opposition to lawyers being in the assembly in New York.90
Later in the eighteenth century, as the general level of professional
training and competence rose, lawyers must have received increased
respect, if not personal esteem. The lawyers who became prominent
as leaders in the growing struggle for liberty no doubt enjoyed much
popularity. However, this was offset by the popular feeling against
the many who were loyalists, a feeling that persisted even after the
Revolution.9' It is doubtful that the legal system itself gained popularity
as the Revolution approached. For instance, in Massachusetts, due to the
handling of the trials of the British soldiers involved in the Boston Mas-
sacre of 1770, the entire court system lost public confidence, which it
did not regain until the revolutionary government reorganized the courts
during the Revolution. 92
Legal Materials
Traditionally, legal scholars have taken the position that eighteenth
87. The statements concerning Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia are
supported by WARREN, supra note 41, at 44-49, 54-56, 104-10, 119-43.
88. Hr uy, supra note 52, at 216 (Massachusetts); Reinsch, supra note 5, at 395, 406
(New Jersey, Virginia).
89. Duarr , supra note 86, at 37-38.
90. Reinsch, supra note 5, at 394.
91. AumANN, THE CHANGING AMERIcAN LEGAL SYSTEM 80-81 (1940).
92. Cushing, The judiciary and Public Opinion in Revolutionary Massachusetts, in
LAw AND AurHoRrry IN COLONIAL AMERICA 168-73 (Billias ed. 1965).
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
century colonial law libraries were small and that they contained in-
complete selections of English authorities. Warren says fifty to a hun-
dred books would have been a large number for a lawyer and that
Judge Edmund Trowbridge of Massachusetts was probably the only
lawyer whose library contained all the valuable English law books then
existing. 3
An examination of the first volume of Harris & McHenry's Reports
for Maryland (1658-1774) raises the question of whether there were
far more English law books in eighteenth century America than has
been generally supposed. All cases in that volume were scanned and
notations made of the English case reporters and secondary authorities
cited. For the most part, the citations were shown as having been given
as authority by counsel arguing before the Supreme Court of Maryland.
The earliest citation was noted in the 1718 case of Tanner v. Freeland.4
There was much irregularity in the form of citations, and in some in-
stances it has not been possible to reconcile them with known English
publications. 5
In all, eighty-four English case reporters were cited in 1 Harris &
McHenry, most of them having been referred to repeatedly. Coke's
Reports, Time of Elizabeth, was the first to be cited. The citations
tended to be mainly to King's Bench reports, such as Coke's Reports,
with the fewest citations to equity reporters and with the proportion
of Common Pleas citations increasing slightly with time. Fifty-five
English treatises were cited, Coke on Littleton being the first and fa-
vorite. Abridgments, such as Rolle's, Bacon's, and Viner's, were used
quite a bit, though perhaps not so much as to indicate a great lack of
case materials. As a matter of curiosity, Blackstone's Commentaries
were first cited in 1768 and seemed to have had a slight effect on the
course of colonial law.
The citation of cases in 1 Harris & McHenry was generally without
comment, except in some later decisions, where the reporters occasionally
gave details of the English cases. However, the English references were
cited as authority in support of arguments and propositions advanced
by counsel. They obviously were regarded as having some force.
Throughout, English cases were cited far more times than were sec-
93. Wvam N, supra note 41, at 160-66.
94. 1 Md. 34 (1718).
95. For the purpose of identifying publications the writer has referred to the table
of abbreviations supplied by Professor Cooley on p. ixv of the first volume of his
third edition of BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (1884).
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ondary authorities. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the
citation of treatises and abridgments picked up considerably after 1760,
which is contrary to what we might have expected. There is no way
of knowing how many cases were lifted from secondary authorities
without the cases themselves having been read. Therefore, it cannot
be concluded that all the English reporters cited existed in Maryland.
However, since treatises and abridgments were cited mainly in the later
years covered by 1 Harris & McHenry, perhaps it may be inferred that
lawyers' libraries tended to contain reporters at an earlier time than
they contained secondary authorities and that cases were not lifted in
large numbers.
Despite unanswered questions and doubts, the list of English authori-
ties relied upon in 1 Harris & McHenry is impressive. If nothing else,
it shows a regular use of English common-law rules as authority from
early in the eighteenth century. And the inference is strong that many
or most of the reports and treatises cited were present in the colony,
though scattered in various law libraries. All this casts some doubt upon
the commonly accepted belief that English legal materials were scarce
or little relied upon in the colonies until just before the Revolution.
From the previous discussion it can be seen that, with respect to recep-
tion of the common law, Maryland was fairly typical of the colonies
from New York south. The New England colonies, of course, were
less disposed to pattern their affairs upon things English, from which
it may be conjectured that the existence and citation of English
common-law authorities was less in New England than in Maryland
and other southern colonies.
Role of the British Government
One would suppose the theory and practice of the British government
regarding the American colonies would have a great deal to do with
implementation of the common law there. This seems not to have been
the case, but the evidence on either theory or practice is sketchy. In
the first place, no complete or consistent theory seems to have been
worked out as to the effect of the common law, though one was as to
the effect of statutes. In the second place, as to practice, there were few
appeals from the colonies, and they seemed generally to involve ques-
tions of the validity of colonial statutes. The English government was
too preoccupied with more important matters-making the colonies prof-
itable elements in a mercantile system-to give much attention to inter-
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nal legal affairs. There appears to have been more interest in statute
law than in common law; questions on statutes will be discussed only
as they shed light on the status of the common law in the colonies.
The English courts themselves never settled the theoretical question
of the common law in the American colonies. 6 English lawyers and
writers had little interest in colonial legal affairs. For instance, when
George Chalmers wrote his Political Annals of the Present United
Colonies in London in 1780, he could find no published legal opinion
of appeals taken to England from the colonies and had to consult
archives. 97
Some propositions of colonial law were settled. Since 1609, it was
accepted that if the English king conquered a Christian land, that land's
laws remained in effect until the king changed them.98 If the conquered
land were not Christian, its laws being contrary to the laws of God,
the prior laws were automatically revoked, and the king was to rule by
"natural equity" until he could enact new laws.99 Finally, "if there be a
new and uninhabited country found out by English subjects, as the law
is the birthright of every subject, so, wherever they go, they carry their
laws with them, and therefore such new found country is to be gov-
erned by the laws of England.... 100
When it came to applying the rules to America, some confusion re-
sulted. In 1707, it was held in Smitb v. Brown & Cooper'01 that Vir-
ginia had been conquered from infidels and that the common law did
not automatically extend to the colony. Blackstone similarly states that
the American colonies were "principally" so acquired and that "the com-
mon law of England, as such, has no allowance or authority there." 102
One serious doubt is at once apparent about the premises upon which
the Smitb case and Blackstone's view are predicated. Were the col-
onies really lands conquered from foreign princes, or were they more
like previously uninhabited lands? Would it not be nearer the truth
96. Radin, The Rivalry of Comnon-Law and Civil Law Ideas in the American
Colonies, in 2 LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 404, 411 (1937).
97. Washburn, supra note 44, at 118-19.
98. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1609) (dictum); Blankard v. Galdy, 9L
Eng. Rep. 356 (K.B. 1693).
99. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1609) (dictum).
100. Anonymous, 24 Eng. Rep. 646 (1722) (determination by Privy Council upon
appeal from the foreign Plantations); Blankard v. Galdy, 91 Eng. Rep. 356 (K.B. 1693)
(dictum).
101. 91 Eng. Rep. 566 (K.B. 1707).
102. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0107-08.
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to say that some p~rts of the new land were conquered and some parts
previously uninhabited? Since the Indians did not live in geographically
fixed nations in the European sense, could the lines between conquered
and uninhabited parts be determined? What about lands acquired peace-
fully from the Indians by treaty or purchase? In 1756, Britain's attorney
general Charles Platt and solicitor general Charles Yorke rendered an
opinion that the common law was in force in such places.103
To complicate the situation further, in 1720, after the date of Smith
v. Brown & Cooper, Attorney General Richard West was of the opinion
that the common law of England was the common law of "the Plan-
tations." 104 Then, in 1727, in the celebrated case of Winthrop v.
Lechmere,'0° the Privy Council held that the Connecticut intestacy
statute, which divided realty equally among the decedent's children,
was void. This was on the ground that it was "contrary to the laws of
England," the reference being of course to the common-law rule of
primogeniture.
The Privy Council heard appeals from the colonies and also passed
upon the validity of colonial statutes. It seems the Council's main con-
cern was that decisions and statutes should not be contrary. to those parts
of the statutory law of England that were binding upon the colonies.
Even within this limited sphere the Council showed an inconsistency
and leniency that was probably due to a practical, realistic approach to
colonial conditions.
Except for Carolina, Maryland, Connecticut, and Rhode Island dur-
ing the time they were proprietary colonies, the governors of all col-
onies had to submit legislative acts to the Privy Council for approval.
In many cases the acts expired by their own terms before they could
be passed upon. Sometimes it seems the Council was willing to delay
action for years to avoid annulling a statute. 0 6 There must have been
many colonial statutes that, though in clear violation of English statutes,
never were challenged. For instance, a 1705 act of the Pennsylvania
assembly allowed holographic wills, and they were widely used during
the remainder of the colonial period, obviously contrarily to the English
103. CHALmERs, OpiIoNs OF Emru-=fr LAwYERS ON VARIous PorTrs OF ENGLISH
JLUUSPRUTDENcE 207 (1st Amer. ed. 1858).
104. Id. at 206.
105. GOEBEL, CASES ANlD MATERIALS ON =Im DEvELomPmENT OF LEGA. INsTnToNs 398-
401 (1937); Andrews, The Influence of Colonial Conditions as Illustrated in the Can-
necticut Intestacy Law, in 1 SE.Ecr ESSAYS in ANGLo-AmmCAN LEGAL HISTORY 431, 445
(1907).
106. KEIrH, THE FIRST BRITISH EMPIRE 287-88 (1930).
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Statute of Frauds and Perjuries. 1°7 Yet, the Privy Council did disallow
many colonial legislative acts, some of them seemingly less obnoxious
than others which stood. 10 8
The aftermath of Winthrop v. Lechmere is another illustration of
the unevenness of English control over the colonial administration of
justice. In 1738, in Phillips v. Savage the Privy Council was asked to
annul the Massachusetts intestacy statute, which was in all essentials
like the Connecticut statute annulled in the Winthrop case, yet the
Massachusetts statute was upheld because it had previously been con-
firmed by the Council. Meantime Connecticut had continued to use
its intestacy statute despite the decision in Winthrop. Its act was
again challenged before the Privy Council in 1745 in Clark v. Tousey,
but the appeal was dismissed as not having been timely taken. For
practical purposes this was the end of the matter, for Connecticut con-
tinued to use its "annulled" intestacy act, and no one again had the
temerity to make another appeal."0 9
The evidence indicates that the British government, in practice, did
not play a strong role in enforcing the common law in the colonies.
Added to this, we have seen that English legal authorities never decided
for themselves in theory the extent to which the common law should
be enforced. It seems justifiable to conclude that direct influence from
the home government was not a major factor in colonial reception of
the common law.
A Backward Glance
This final section is postulated on the proposition that the common
law was applied in substantially the same fashion when the Revolution
began as it was in the first days of the Republic. To some extent this
proposition is demonstrable. The early judges and lawyers had prac-
ticed before the Revolution. They must have had susbtantially the same
libraries before as after, for presumably no law books came in during
the war. Indeed, one reading the post-Revolutionary cases perceives
that the bench and bar were using long-accustomed processes, mental
and judicial, for deciding cases. The whole tenor of the opinions is
quite convincing that except for some statutes, the judges were apply-
ing the same body of law they had long known.
107. See discussion in Havard v. Davis, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 406, 417-18 (1810).
108. Karns, supra note 106, at 247-51, lists a number of acts that were annulled.
109. Id. at 248-49; Andrews, supra note 105 at 445-63.
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A few words about methods. All appellate decisions reported for
New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina from the end of the Revo-
lution through 1810 have been examined. These states were chosen
principally because they were the first to publish continuous series of
post-Revolutionary reports. Secondarily, their use of common-law prec-
edents is judged reasonably typical, at least of those colonies outside
New England. For New York the reports examined were volumes 1-3
of Johnson's Cases, volumes 1-3 of Caines's Reports, and volumes 1-6 of
Johnson's Reports, covering in all the period 1798 to 1810. Pennsylvania
materials were volume 4 of Dallas's Reports, volumes 1 and 2 of Bin-
ney's Reports, and volumes 3 and 4 of Yeates's Reports, extending, with
some overlapping among the reporters, from 1790 to 1810. For South
Carolina volumes 1 and 2 of Bay's Reports and volumes 1 and 2 of
Brevard's Reports, running from 1783 to 1811 with some overlapping,
were used.
The evidence sought and recorded consisted of remarks by the judges
as to their own understanding of how they were to apply English
common-law precedents. What is summarized here is a contemporary
judicial commentary on that subject. No attempt was made to deter-
mine if the holdings, case by case, matched English rules, for this would
entail the virtual compilation of an encyclopedia of English common
law circa 1800. In the end, it may be doubtful that the product of such
monumental labor would produce a general view much different from
what shall be seen.
With all three states involved, there was either a statute or a consti-
tutional clause in some wise speaking to common-law reception. In
New York, it was the constitution of 20 April 1777, in effect until
1821, that contained this clause:
[S]uch parts of the common law of England, and of the statute
law of England and Great Britain, and of the acts of the legisla-
ture of the colony of New York, as together did form the law of
the said colony on the 19th day of April, in the year of our Lord
one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, shall be and continue
the law of this State, subject to such alterations and provisions as
the legislature of this State shall, from time to time, make con-
cerning the same.... That all such parts of the said common law,
and all such of the said statutes and acts aforesaid, or parts thereof,
as may be construed to establish or maintain any particular de-
nomination of Christians or their ministers, or concern the al-
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legiance heretofore yielded to, and the supremacy, sovereignty,
government, or prerogatives claimed or exercised by, the King of
Great Britain and his predecessors, over the colony of New York
and its inhabitants, or are repugnant to this constitution, be, and
they hereby are, abrogated and rejected."10
Unlike New York, Pennsylvania did not mention reception of the
common law in its constitution. Rather a statute of 28 January 1777
provided:
[E] ach and every one of the laws or acts of general assembly that
were in force and binding on the inhabitants of the said province
on the fourteenth day of May last shall be in force and binding on
the inhabitants of this state from and after the tenth day of Febru-
ary next. .. and the common liw and such of the statute laws
of England as have heretofore been in force in the said province,
except as is hereafter excepted." 1
In South Carolina, the matter was handled differently. The Colonial
Act of 12 December 1712, after specifically adopting the 126 English
statutes enumerated by Chief Justice Trott, also provided:
All and every part of the common law of England, where the same
is not altered by the above enumerated acts, or inconsistent with
the particular constitutions, customs and laws of this Province
[except for certain matters of feudal land law and ecclesiastical
law] . . . is hereby made and declared to be in as full force and
virtue within this Province, as the same is or ought to be within,
the said kingdom of England .... 112
This Colonial Act of Assembly was adopted and carried forward into
statehood sucessively by the constitutions of 26 March 1776, 19 March
1778, and 3 June 1790. 3 So, there is special reason to suppose that
reception matters in South Carolina would be handled after the Revo-
lution as they were before.
110. N. Y. CoNsT. art. XXXV (1777), reproduced in 5 THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSUTUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS, 2623, 2635-36 (1909).
111. 9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 29-30 (Mitchell & Flanders eds. 1903).
112. Reproduced in J. GRrmKE, PUBLIC LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 99 (1790), and also
in 1 J. BREVARD, ALPHAETICAL DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA
136-37 (1814).
113. 6 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3247, 3255, 3264 (1909).
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Perhaps the most remarkable general observation that can be made
is as to what was not done and said in the courts. None of the recep-
tion clauses or acts were ever explained or interpreted, but their purpose
was quite faithfully followed. The courts in the three states cited Eng-
lish cases and secondary authorities regularly, easily, and without any
feeling they had to explain their doing so." 4 In any extended or diffi-
cult case, requiring doctrinal discussion, English authorities would gen-
erally be relied upon. Hardly any hostility to English courts is to be
found; in fact, deference was often shown for the learning of English
judges. Although in their separate or dissenting opinions the various
judges might reach contrary results and might disagree as to the state
of the common law, there seems to have been underlying agreement
that the English Common law as they saw ,it was usually binding.
Though the judges, by their actions, evinced a practice of following
common-law decisions, they wrote little on the process. Not once do
we find anything like a full-dress review of the reception doctrine; the
courts were far less aware of the question than we are. About as ex-
tended a statement as can be found is this one by Chief Justice Kent:
"But whatever may be our opinions on the point, as an abstract ques-
tion, or whatever may be the decisions of the civil law, or the feudal
and municipal law of other countries, we must decide this question by
the common law of England." 115 Perhaps the most complete exposition
was the remark by the South Carolina Constitutional Court "that the
common law was of force in South Carolina, and formed by far the
greatest and most important part of her system of jurisprudence." -16
Ten or twelve other cases contain remarks of like vein, but are less
sweeping.1 7
114. For instance, the earliest volume of New York reports, 1 Johnson's Cases (1798-
1800), contains 184 decisions of the Supreme Court and three for the Court for the
Correction of Errors. Of the Supreme Court decisions, 130 were per curium ones
containing no citations of authority, 24 were full opinions without English citations, and
30 cited English authorities. Of the three decisions for the Court for the Correction
of Errors, two cited English cases. Fifty-three English reports were relied upon 218
times and 13 secondary authorities 29 times. This included nine references to ConE ON
LrrrLEToN but none to Blackstone. In general, later reporters in all three states contain
a considerably larger frequency of English citations; volume 1 Johnson's Cases tends to
the minimum instead of maximum intensity of citations for the period 1783-1810.
115. Frost v. Raymond, 2 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 188, 191 (1804).
116. Wells v. Martin, 2 Bay (S.C.) 20, 21 (1796).
117. Post v. Neafie, 3 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 22, 36 (1805); Lansing v. Fleet, 2 Johns. Cas.
(N.Y.) 3 (1800); Conroe v. Birdsall, 1 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 127, 128 (1799); Jackson
ex derm. Cooder v. Woods, 1 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 163, 167 (1799); Bender v. Fromberger,
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Tempering what has just been said, the early state courts did not feel
bound to slavish attendance upon English precedents. Under certain
circumstances they would refuse to follow them, somewhat more freely,
it appears, than a present-day state court will overrule its own prior
decisions. The English rule was on occasion departed from if judged
not compatible with conditions in America118 or "unreasonable," 119
or, quite possibly, for no stated reason.120  A British rule that turned
on some statute not in force in a state might be disregarded, the cause
for it having disappeared.'21 There was, especially in South Carolina,
a fairly evident feeling that procedural, as contrasted with substantive,
rules were peculiarly within the local court's domain; hence, the judges
were more willing to abandon English rules of practice and procedure. 22
Certain classes of English decisions were apt to be accorded little
4 U.S. (4 Dal.) 441, 444-45 (1806); Respublica v. Cleaver, 5 Yeates (Pa.) 69, 73 (1804);
Cooper v. Cooper, 2 Brev. (S.C.) 355, 358 (1810); Fleming v. M'Clure, 1 Brev. (S.C.)
428, 432-33 (1804) (gratuitous statement about English law merchant); Comm'rs of the
Treasury v. Brevard, 1 Brev. (S.C.) 11, 13 (1794); Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 Bay (S.C.) 8,
10 (1784).
118. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 336, 337 (1804) (celebrated case where
court split 2-2 on whether truth was defense to libel); Walker v. Chichester, 2 Brev.
(S.C.) 67 (1806); Snee v. Trice, 2 Bay (S.C.) 345 (1802); White v. Chambers, 2 Bay
(S.C.) 70 (1796); Hall v. Smith, 1 Bay (S.C.) 330 (1793).
119. Bayard v. Malcolm, 2 Johns. (N.Y.) 550, 554-58 (1807); Leatherwood v. Wood-
roof, 2 Brev. (S.C.) 380, 385 (1810); Clark v. Minton, 2 Brev. (S.C.) 185, 188 (1807).
120. People v. Howell, 4 Johns. (N.Y.) 296, 302 (1809) (dictum); Johnson v. Stagg,
2 Johns. (N.Y.) 510, 522-23 (1807); People v. Barrett, 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 66 (1806) (2-2
decision in which Judges Tompkins and Thompson seem willing to depart from the
English rule); Ludlow v. Bowne, 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 1 (1806); Jackson ex dem. Van
Denberg v. Bradt, 2 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 169 (1804); Kane v. Ingraham, 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.)
403 (1801); White v. M'Neily, 1 Bay (S.C.) 11 (1784). See also the hotly contested
group of New York cases involving validity of English prize-court decisions, in which
English rules were dealt with in cavalier fashion if not dispensed with. Rhinelander
v. Juhel, 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 487 (1802); Laing v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.)
487 (1802); Johnston v. Ludlow, 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 481 (1802); Goix v. Low, 2 Johns.
Cas. (N.Y.) 480 (1802); Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 451
(1802).
121. Jackson ex dem. Trowbridge v. Dunsbaugh, 1 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 91 (1799);
Warnock v. Wightman, 1 Brev. (S.C.) 331, 354, 367-69 (1804); Munro v. Holmes,
1 Brev. (S.C.) 319 (1804); Murrell v. Mathews, 2 Bay (S.C.) 397 (1802). Warnock
and Murrell hold that, because the Statute De Donis had never been adopted in South
Carolina, a limitation to "A and the heirs of his body" created the ancient conditional
fee instead of a fee tail. Particularly in Warnock the court displays considerable
knowledge of common-law development in reaching its historically defensible result.
122. Bayard v. Malcolm, 2 Johns. (N.Y.) 550 (1807); Douglass v. Wight, 2 Brev.
(S.C.) 218, 219 (1807); Bevin v. Linguard, 1 Brev. (S.C.) 503 (1805); Hane v. Goodwyn,
2 Bay (S.C.) 521 (1804); Perkins v. McIntosh, 1 Brev. (S.C.) 18, 22 (1797).
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force, such as nisi prius ones or cases thought to have been unreliably
reported.123 Of course, British cases handed down after 1776 were not
considered binding, though they might be persuasive, much as a sister
state's decision would be today.124 On questions on which the English
authorities were in conflict or where none was in point, the state courts
had to devise their own rules, drawing upon their own sense of reason-
ableness and perhaps having recourse to civil-law analogies. 125
Once a state court, by a prior decision, had established a rule on a
given issue, that rule was treated with great reverence thereafter. The
decisions contain some categorical assertions that prior cases had to be
followed, even if they were shown to conflict with settled English
rules.' 20 In other words, by 1800, New York, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina understood a thoroughgoing doctrine of stare decisis, at least
as strong as that applied today, contrary to what had been thought by
some contemporary writers. 27
Legal historians have exhibited interest in the treatment of English
precedents in maritime matters. Did the early state courts show a pref-
erence for Continental authorities? When there were English maritime
cases in point, the judges seemed to feel as bound to follow them as
to follow English cases in other areas, though Continental writers might
be cited also.' 28 If English cases were lacking or were conflicting, then
civil-law commentators were quite persuasive. 29
123. Hartness v. Thompson, 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 160, 161 (1809); Walden v. Le Roy,
2 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 263, 264 (1805); Jackson ex dem. Lewis v. Larroway, 2 Johns. Cas.
(N.Y.) 114, 115 (1800).
124. Upton v. Vail, 6 Johns. (N.Y.) 181 (1810); Penny v. New York Ins. Co., 3
Cai. R. (N.Y.) 155, 159 (1805) (dictum); Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns.
Cas. (N.Y.) 127, 137, 147 (1801); Bogert v. Hildreth, 1 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 1, 3 (1803);
Johnson v. Bloodgood, 1 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 51, 56 (1799).
125. Coit v. Houston, 3 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 243 (1802); Winton v. Saidler, 3 Johns.
Cas. (N.Y.) 185, 190 (1802) (minority opinion by Judge Kent); Holmes v. Lansing,
I Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 248 (1800).
126. Colden v. Dopkin, 3 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 171, 172 (1805); Van Raugh v. Van Arsdaln,
3 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 154, 155 (1805); Champneys v. Johnson, 2 Brev. (S.C.) 268 (1809);
Eveleigh v. Sylvester, 2 Brev. (S.C.) 178 (1807); Bevin v. Linguard, 1 Brev. (S.C.) 503
(1805); State v. Creight, 1 Brev. (S.C.) 169 (1802); Nelson v. Emerson, 1 Brev. (S.C.)
48 (1802).
127. E.g., see Kempin, Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850,
3 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 28 (1959).
128. United Ins. Co. v. Lenox, 1 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 377 (1800) (semble); Le Roy,
Bayard & M'Evers v. Gouverneur, 1 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 226, 227 (1800); Seton, Maitland
& Co. v. Low, 1 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 1 (1799); Forbes v. Rice, 2 Brev. (S.C.) 363, 368
(1810); Sasportas v. Jennings, I Bay (S.C.) 470 (1795).
129. Morgan v. Insurance Co. of North America, 4 Pa. (4 Dall.) 455, 458 (1806);
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During the eighteenth century there was a maturation of colonial
legal systems. With much unevenness from colony to colony, the bench
and bar became better trained and better regulated. English-educated
lawyers probably exerted appreciable influence in the middle and south-
ern colonies, particularly South Carolina and Virginia, but elsewhere
their numbers and impact must have been small. It seems that adequate
common-law books were present in at least some of the colonies, though
doubtless in scattered libraries. Certainly it can be said that in the fairly
typical colonies of New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, the
common law was knowable and for the most part followed by the time
of the Revolution. The reception process had been very much an in-
digenous affair, for the English home government had acted only halt-
ingly to impose adoption of the common law.
In the beginning we used the simile of a temporal bridge, suspended
between a pillar set in 1607 and another in 1776. At the 1607 end there
was no common law in the colonies. In 1776? The post-Revolutionary
evidence makes it nigh conclusive that Chief Justice Daniel Horsmanden
spoke not only for New York but of colonial America when he said
in 1765 that the courts applied the common law "in the main." 180
The ends of the bridge are secure, even if the floor has some missing
planks.
M'Bride v. Marine Ins. Co., 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 299, 307 (1810); Mumford v. Commercial Ins.
Co, 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 262, 267 (1810); Watson v. Duykinck, 3 Johns. (N.Y.) 335, 339
(1808); Griswold v. New York Ins. Co., 3 Johns. (N.Y.) 321, 325 (1808); Scott v. Libby,
2 Johns. (N.Y.) 336, 340 (1807); Schmidt v. United Ins. Co., 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 249, 265
(1806); Walden v. Le Roy, 2 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 263, 265 (1805); Leavenworth v. Delafield,
1 Ca. R. (N.Y.) 573, 575 (1804); Arnold v. United Ins. Co., I Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 363
(1800).
180. WARRFN, HIsToRY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 91 (1912).
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